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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Business and Occupation Tax-Constitutionality. The Washington
court denied the claim of General Motors that the Washington Busi-
ness and Occupation Tax2 violated the due process and commerce
clauses as applied to its interstate business of wholesaling new cars.
The Tax Commission had determined that the activities of General
Motors within the state subjected the corporation to this tax on its
gross receipts.
The main appeal involved the activities of the Portland, Oregon
'"zone office," 3 part of the Chevrolet, Pontiac and Oldsmobile divisions
which were divided countrywide into "regions," "zones" and "districts."
The Portland "zone office" supervised the activities of the "district
managers," who contacted the retail dealers in Washington. These
"district managers" combined promotional and employee training
activities with their liason functions. They normally resided in the
district, but never had an office. Although the "district manager"
might advise the dealer about his purchase of cars, the orders for new
cars were sent directly to the Portland "zone office," where they were
accepted and filled, f.o.b. the factory.
The cross appeal by General Motors contested the taxation of sales
allocated to the Seattle branch office of the Portland "zone office."
This branch office performed expediting functions for the sales of
Chevrolet in the northern counties of Washington. Only receipts from
ington court in Yiatchos used state rather than federal law to protect the wife's
interest. (To say that the prescription of federal fraud is dictum--see p. 117-is
erroneous since it was necessary for the Court to spell out the reasons for remanding
vice reversing and thus further necessary to describe what law controlled the "fraud
exception.") Although the Note cogently argues for preservation of state law it
fails to mention the federal interest in the bonds which is served by rejecting the
"convenience theory." A more serious shortcoming however is the conceptual ap-
proach, i.e., that the decision turned on the wording of the Treasury regulations (see
in particular note 14, p. 116)-or that the court "relied" on Wissrer to reach the
result in Free. This of course fails to come to grips with the core of Free-the
policy decision which the Supreme Court made: How should the regulations be
construed?
I General Motors Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 160 Wash. Dec. 867, 376 P2d 843
(1962). General Motors has appealed this case to the United States Supreme Court
under the second clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958). The court has not ruled on the
appeal at this writing.
2 RCW 82.04.220 Business and Occupation Tax Imposed. There is levied and shall
be collected from every person a tax for the act or privilege of engaging in business
activities. Such tax shall be measured by the application of rates against value of
products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as the case may be.
3 It is interesting to note that General Motors established a new "zone office" in
Seattle after the taxing period involved. General Motors has paid the gross receipts
tax on sales allocated to this office and has not contested its liability for them.
160 Wash. Dec. at 875, 376 P.2d at 848 (1962).
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the sale of cars processed through this branch office were held con-
stitutionally taxable by the trial court.
The state also levied a tax on the Parts Division of General Motors.
This division operated a warehouse in Portland to supply parts to
dealers. The orders for these parts also came directly from the dealers
in Washington.
The state levied a gross receipts tax on these divisions on the theory
that the activities of the "district managers" brought the business
within the state. General Motors argued that this activity was not
enough to give the state due process jurisdiction to levy the tax.
Further, even if there was jurisdiction to tax, the gross recipts tax
was invalid as a "direct burden" on interstate commerce.
Probably the first step in testing a state tax is to characterize it.
Prior Washington cases have stated that the tax here involved is an
"excise tax upon every person for the privilege of doing business in
this state."4 It is essential to note that the tax is levied on gross re-
ceipts, a kind of tax recognized as similar to a sales tax in its ultimate
effect on interstate commerce.' Thus the constitutional principles ap-
plied to state sales taxes can serve as guides for analyzing the vulner-
ability of interstate commerce to a gross receipts tax.
The Washington court was quite elaborate in its argument that the
state had due process jurisdiction to impose the tax. Preoccupation
with due process seems to miss the primary issue. As Mr. Justice
Rutledge has stated, "the great difficulty in allocating taxing power as
a matter of due process between the state of origin and the state of
market arises from the fact that each state, considered without refer-
ence to the other, always has a sufficiently substantial relation in fact
and in tax benefit conferred to the interstate transaction to sustain an
exertion of its taxing power, a fact not always recognized."6
It must be readily admitted, however, that some decisions of the
4 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 193 Wash. 451, 454, 75 P.2d 1017,
1018 (1938), rev'd 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Puget Sound Stevedoring v. State Tax
Comm'n, 189 Wash. 131, 135, 63 P.2d 532, 533 (1937) modified, 302 U.S. 250 (1937).
In General Motors, the court states that the tax "is imposed upon business activity
within the state," supra note 1, at 882, 376 P.2d at 852. The Supreme Court normally
adopts the characterizations given a state tax by the courts of that state. See, e.g.,
Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
5 International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944) ; Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate
Income From a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 102 (1959) ; Comment, 54
COLUAI. L. REV. 261, 267 (1954) ; Comment, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 1022 (1962). But
see Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537, (1951) (distinguishing a sales
tax as falling on the buyer and a gross receipts tax as falling on the vendor).




United States Supreme Court have been based entirely upon due
process concepts. McLeod v. Dilwortk Co.' is a notable example. The
court denied Arkansas the right to impose a sales tax on transactions
solicited by traveling salesmen, where acceptance and delivery were
allocated to the home office of the corporation in Tennessee. The
divided court held that "for Arkansas to impose a tax on such transac-
tions would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an
interstate transaction."' The United States Supreme Court could
reverse the General Motors decision simply on its similarity to McLeod
v. Dilworth Co. But analysis under the commerce clause would seem
preferable since the Court would then have to determine the effect of
the tax upon interstate commerce.
There are at least two9 current theories on the perplexing question
of how much the commerce clause' ° protects interstate transactions
from state taxation. Regardless of which theory predominates, the
United States Supreme Court will probably reverse the Washington
decision allowing taxation of the gross receipts on General Motors'
interstate transactions. An exception may be allowed for the sales
expedited through the Seattle branch office.
The classical theory regards a gross receipts tax on an interstate
transaction as a constitutionally prohibited "direct burden" on inter-
state commerce." But the court has allowed gross receipts taxes where
7322 U.S. 327 (1944).
8 Id. at 330.
9 Mr. Justice Black has advocated a third theory that has not been accepted by the
court. He maintains that only state taxes which discriminate against interstate com-
merce may be struck down under the commerce clause. See his dissent in Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938). For a brief and clear discussion of the three
differing views of "undue burden" see Hellerstein, The Power of Congress to Restrict
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 12 J. TAXATION 302, 303 (1960).
10 U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
"1 Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887) reasons that
since a state could not tax the transportation of an interstate common carrier, it could
not tax the gross receipts as this would also be a regulation of interstate commerce.
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1903) applied the same reasoning
to invalidate a gross receipts tax on a domestic railroad. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917) invalidated a tax on gross receipts of sales made in the
state to foreign customers as a tax on such commerce and therefore a regulation of
that commerce. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 250
(1937) struck down the Washington gross receipts tax on the business of longshoring
as a tax on interstate commerce but allowed the tax on the receipts of the firm from
supplying longshoremen to ships since this was a "local business." Joseph v. Carter &
Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) followed the Puget Sound case. For
an excellent discussion of the evolution of the "indirect-direct burden" theory see
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and An Appraisal, 46
VA. L. REv. 1051, 1065 (1960). Professor Hartman traces the "direct burden" theory
to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)
where the court struck down a state license fee on the business of importing as a pro-
hibited duty on imports and an attempted regulation of the commerce. The "indirect
burden" part of the theory is related to the "Cooley Compromise" made in Cooley v.
1963]
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the subject of the tax is "localized" to the taxing state12 or where the
tax is imposed "in lieu" of local property taxes.' In these situations
"'gross receipts" are only the measure of the taxes, which are allowed
because they are only "indirect burdens" on interstate commerce.
Thus, under the classical theory, a state can avoid the prohibition by
making the subject of the tax "local," i.e., by using interstate "gross
proceeds" as a measure for the "local" tax.
If the court applies the classical test to the transactions in the
General Motors, case, it will probably rule the tax invalid. Since these
are definitely interstate contracts or sales, it appears that the tax is
"on" interstate commerce since there are no incidents which can be
classified as "local" to bring the tax within the "indirect burden"
category. Perhaps the sales expedited through the Seattle office will
be found to be "local." Otherwise the tax will fall as a "direct burden."
The other major commerce clause theory was introduced by Mr.
Justice Stone in Western Live Stock 4 where he explained his view that
interstate commerce should bear its cost of state protection, but that
it should not be subjected to the risk of "cumulative burdens not
imposed on local commerce." This theory played a dominant role in
the Berwind-White" case, where a New York City sales tax was upheld
as applied to the sale of Pennslyvania coal delivered by a New York
branch office. While Mr. Justice Stone paid homage to the "indirect
burdens" theory in the Berwind-White case, he relied on the concept of
"multiple burdens."'" Since both the sale and delivery had taken place
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851), which allowed state regulation
of certain local incidents of interstate commerce which do not require a uniform
national rule. For a short summary agreeing with this analysis, see Hellerstein, supra
note 9, at 302.
12 Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911) allowed a gross receipts
tax on a car dealer who sent customers' orders to an out-of-state manufacturer. The
Court found sufficient local activity by the dealer to localize the sale within the state.
Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941) allowed a gross
receipts tax on an out-of-state buyer who immediately resold to another who in turn
immediately shipped the goods out of state. The court held the sale was localized to
the taxing state. Accord, International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340, (1944). For the facts see note 25 infra.
' Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). Here the court upheld
the application of a gross receipts tax on the business of renting railway cars used in
the state "in lieu" of a property tax that could have been levied against the cars. In
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959), the court upheld a "fran-
chise tax" imposed on express companies "in lieu" of property taxes where the measure
of the tax was gross receipts allocated to the state.
14 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Here the
court upheld a state tax on the gross receipts from out-of-state purchasers of adver-
tising space in a magazine that circulated in interstate commerce.
15 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
16 It is important to note that Mr. Justice Stone refused to follow the old "indirect-
local" rule that if goods are brought into the state under previous order they cannot
be subject to the local sales tax. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes, 53
[VOL. 38
WASHINGTON CASE LAW
in New York, no other state could subject the transaction to a similar
gross receipts tax. Thus there would be no risk of a double tax burden
not borne by local business.
The Washington court discussed the "multiple burdens" test, but it
seems to have missed the main point. General Motors argued17 that
the Washington statutory scheme operates to subject the corporation to
multiple taxation not borne by local manufacturers. Washington manu-
facturers who also wholesale are given an exemption by the statute.1 8
Since General Motors paid a manufacturing tax in Michigan, it suffered
double taxation. The court correctly rejected this argument, stating
that manufacturing and wholesaling are two different taxing subjects.
But the court did not discuss the true "multiple burdens" danger, i.e.,
possible double taxation of the same incident-the sale. The court
agreed that the acceptance of the orders took place in Portland (and
indicated that delivery also took place there). This concession, com-
bined with the location of the "zone office" in Portland, gives Oregon an
equal if not greater "right" to tax the sale of business measured by gross
receipts. This is precisely the risk of "multiple burdens" that con-
cerned Mr. Justice Stone in the Western Live Stock and Berwind-White
cases. It appears that the United States Supreme Court could reverse
the Washington court under the "multiple burdens" theory also.
It is difficult to predict which of the two current theories will pre-
dominate in the future. Just when the "multiple burdens" test was
taking hold, the court handed down the famous Freeman v. Hewit19
decision. This case held that Indiana could not assess the gross
receipts of a sale of stock through the New York Stock Exchange.
The importance of the case lies in the return to the "direct burden"
test. Mr. Justice Frankfurter described the gross receipts tax as "a
direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for
more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Com-
merce Clause."2 The protest to the Freeman case was very loud in
some quarters:
H.xv. L. REv. 909, 911, 916 (1940) for an excellent discussion of the evolution of
the old rule in Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921) and Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923).
Other cases using the "multiple burdens" test include Gwin, White & Prince, Inc.
v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) and Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307(1938). Lip service was paid to the theory in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,
334 U.S. 653 (1948) and Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422
(1947).
17 Brief for Respondent, p. 92.
18 RCW 82.04.440.
19 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
2 0 Id. at 256.
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With all the modesty of omnipotence, the Freeman Court jettisoned,
as mere "fashions" in judicial writing, the "multiple burdens" doctrine,
which had been painstakingly and systematically developed, especially
by Justices Stone and Rutledge, in an effort to require interstate com-
merce to pay its way....
The Freeman v. Hewit test of constitutionality is essentially a throw
back to the discarded pre-Stone Age "direct-indirect" burden test...."
While the same result would have been reached under the "multiple
burdens" test, the Freeman decision refused to follow this newer
theory.
Another important decision appearing to follow the "direct burdens"
test is the Norton22 case. Illinois levied a gross receipts tax on a Massa-
chusetts corporation operating a retail store in Illinois. The taxes on
(1) sales across the counter were not contested. The court upheld
the tax on (2) orders routed through the local retail store for accept-
ance in Massachusetts. The court placed the burden on the corporation
to show that these transactions were "dissociated from the local busi-
ness and interstate in nature."" (3) Orders sent directly to the home
office by Illinois customers were held to be "clearly interstate in
character," 4 precluding taxation by Illinois.
The Norton case has presented a problem to the state courts because
of its apparent stress on the presence of a "local office." The Wash-
ington court rejected the argument that there must be an office in the
taxing state. This appears to be a correct interpretation of Norton
which emphasized that the Norton Company was doing a local retail
business in the taxing state (as contrasted to mere solicitation). Thus
the test is not whether there is a local office, but whether there is a local
business. If the interstate corporation is maintaining a local business,
then under Norton, it must segregate its local and interstate business
to avoid taxation on all the business.
The quandary in the General Motors case is whether the transactions
can be allocated to a "local business" or whether they are merely
"solicitations" falling under the category of "clearly interstate" trans-
21 Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Comnerce: A Survey and An Appraisal,
46 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1083 (1960). See Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frank-furter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957) where the author
traces Mr. Justice Frankfurter's return to "direct burdens" through the theory that
the commerce clause created an "area of free trade among the several states." This
expression is found in McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) and is further
developed in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 349 (1946).22 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
23 Id. at 537.
24 Id. at 539.
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actions. The Washington court classified the activities of the "district
managers" as "local business." Under Norton, then, General Motors
could avoid taxation only by showing that the transactions were dis-
associated from the activity of the "district managers." But it can be
argued that the "district managers" were merely soliciting "clearly
interstate" transactions which would fall within the third category of
Norton. The "multiple burdens" test would avoid the dilemma since
it minimizes the importance of jurisdictional characterizations like
"local office" and "local business."
The "multiple burdens" and "direct burdens" theories both have
been relied upon in recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court,25 a fact which indicates that the Court has not yet settled on a
consistent theory. The General Motors case could provide the court
with an opportunity to end the off-tune duet played by these two
theories over the last twenty years.
KENNETH L. SCHUBERT, JR.
2 5 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1958),
Williams v. Stockham Valve & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959) upheld apportioned
state net income tax on business doing strictly interstate business. While both theories
were mentioned, the decision is primarily grounded on the fact that apportionment pre-
cludes multiple burdens. See generally, Hartinan, supra note 5, at 84, 96; Hellerstein,
supra note 9, at 302. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Franlfurter dissented in this
decision, advocating again the theory that the policy of the commerce clause was to
create a "free trade territory." Another striking feature of this case was the- rapidity
with which it was restricted by Congress. The new legislation, 15 U.S.C.A. § 381
(Supp. 1961), passed under the commerce clause power, prohibited the states. from im-
posing net income taxes on interstate business that merely sent solicitors into the taxing
jurisdiction with acceptance and delivery being made outside. Congress could also
remedy part of the confusion in the area of gross income and sales taxes by exercising
its power in this area.
A recent per curiam decision in State Tax Comm'n v. Pacific States Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 83 Sup. Ct. 925 (1963) reversed the Utah supreme court on the authority
of International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944). In
the latter case the court upheld the application of the Indiana gross income tax to
the following sales of a foreign corporation which had plants and retail stores in
Indiana: 1) sales made by out-of-state branches to customers solicited in Indiana who
took delivery in Indiana; 2) sales by Indiana branches to out-of-state buyers who
took delivery in Indiana, and then transported the goods to another state ;.3) sales by
an Indiana branch to Indiana buyers who took delivery outside the state. These taxes
were upheld because the transactions were all sufficiently local to separate them from
the interstate commerce. The Pacific States case involved the application of a sales
tax on a foreign corporation selling material at its in-state plant where the title passed
to the buyer who was shipping the goods out of state. The Utah court held that the
interstate shipment precluded taxation. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
allowing the tax because of the similarity to the second kind of transaction in Inter-
national Harvester, as both the sale and delivery were made within the state. While
the Pacific States per curiam opinion is based on a decision using the "local" test,
this does not indicate that the court has abandoned the "multiple burdens" test. We
must await a fuller consideration by the court.
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